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The United States and 
decolonization, 1945-1949 
The 17th o f August , 1945, two days a f t e r the Japanese c a p i t u l a t i o n , 
the n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n Indonesia u n i l a t e r a l l y dec la red the 
Repub l ic o f I r ' o n e s i a to be independent. Hard ly three weeks l a t e r on 
the t h i r d o f l sptember, 1945, French sovere ign ty was no longer 
acknowledged .y Vietnamese n a t i o n a l i s t s , who proc la imed the Démo-
c r a t i e Republ ic o f Vietnam. 
The n a t i o n a l i s t révolutions had much in common: 1) s i nce the 
n ineteenth Century, both countries had experienced a long pe r l od o f 
c o l o n i a l r u l e , e x p l o i t a t i o n and fo re ign a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ; 2) a 
revo lu t i ona ry i n t e l l e c t u a l é l i t e and mob i l i zed par ts o f the peasant 
fo rce were the b a s i s o f both n a t i o n a l i s t r é v o l u t i o n s ; and 3) both 
had exper ienced m i l i t a r y and moral defeat o f the c o l o n i a l powers and 
a pé r i od o f Japanese occupa t ion . 
A l so s i m i l a r were French and Dutch r e a c t i o n s : they did not accept 
the'fait accompli', but ins tead inc reased the m i l i t a r y pressure on 
the r a d i c a l n a t o n a l i s t movements and crea ted moderate a l t e r n a t i v e s , 
which were ready to c o l l a b o r a t e w i th the European powers. 
French and Dutch p o l i c i e s were both c l e a r f a i l u r e s . (1) 
The U.S. faced the dllemma of how to r e c o n c i l e i t s I d e o l o g i c a l , 
economic and p o l l t i c a l i n t e r e s t s i n d e c o l o n i z a t i o n w i th i t s I n te res t s 
i n not an tagon iz lng the European powers and i n con ta in i ng communlsm. 
A p o l i c y paper on South East Asían cond i t i ons and on U:S. o b j e c t i v e s 
and p o l i c i e s , formulated 1n June 1945, s ta tes t h a t : 
...a problem for the U.S. ia to harmonize ita policiee in 
regard to tao objectivea: increased politiaal freedom for 
the Far-Eaat and the maintenance of the 
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tmity of the leading United Nations in meeting tht problem (2). 
With regard to the Indonesian independence s t r u g g l e , the Amer i -
can government po in ted out i n 1949 : 
...that the ose of force ( by the Dutah ) in this situa-
tion make8 the solution far more complex and difficult. 
The Republican movement of Indoneeia représenta t i 
largeet single political factor. The Republic hae a 
tuo-fold nature; first i t is a political entity; secondly 
i t is the heart of Indonesian nationalism. This latter 
attribute cannot be eliminated by any amount of military 
force... Real peace in Indonesia aan be expeated only i f 
there is a seulement of the political issues. (S) 
This éva lua t i on had a l ready i n 1948 l ed the U.S. to take an 
Indonesian p r o - n a t i o n a l i s t s tand and to put great d ip lomat ie and 
economic pressure on the Nether lands to make f u r t h e r concessions to 
Indonesian na t i ona l i sm .A s i m i l a r é v a l u a t i o n cou ld have been made i n 
the case o f Vietnam. And y e t , the Truman A d m i n i s t r a t i o n decided a t 
the end o f 1949 and the beginn!ng o f 1950 to support the French 
c o l o n i a l " s o l u t i o n " , r ecogn iz ing the i n e f f e c t i v e Bao Dai regime and 
a i d i n g the French f i n a n c i a l l y i n t h e i r m i l i t a r y e f f o r t aga ins t the 
V ie tminh . Why d i d the U.S. not make the same éva lua t i on i n the case 
o f Vietnam as i n the case o f Indonesia? 
The pe r iod dur ing 1949-50 was one o f g rea t change; i t requ i red a 
r ap i d re fo rmu la t ion o f p o l i c y on the pa r t o f the U .S . i n answer to 
r a p l d l y changing s i t u a t i o n s . The broad and, to a la rge e x t e n t , s t i l l 
v a l i d , concept o f wor ld order w i th i t s s e c u r i t y and i dèo log i ca l 
aspects was f o m u l a t e d i n t h i s p e r i o d . The Uni ted S t a t e s ' " r i s e to 
g l o b a l i s m " was a d i r e c t conséquence of the Second World War. 
In te rven t ion on a g loba l s c a l e was p o t e n t i a l l y p o s s i b l e and i n v o l v e -
ment was d i c t a t e d by an expanded I n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f s e c u r i t y . 
The Truman Doct r ine i d e n t i f i e d the phys i ca l s e c u r i t y o f the U . S . 
w i th the s e c u t i t y o f the whole non-conmunist w o r l d , s a y l n g : 
This is no more than a frank récognition that totalitarian 
régimes imposed upon free peoplee, by direct or indirect 
oppression, undermine the foundations of international 
peaoe and hence the security of the United States. (4) 
Severa l t héo r i es have been put forward to e x p l a i n the U . S . ' 
a t t i t u d e towards d e c o l o n i z a t i o n and i t s involvement i n the t h l r d 
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wor ld a f t e r the Second World War i n g e n e r a l : whether s t r e s s i n g the i deo -
l o g i c a l aspect (U .S . defense o f a p l u r a l i s t s o c i e t y ) , the s e c u r i t y 
aspect ( involvement can be exp la ined i n terms o f containment or balance 
o f power ) , o r the economic i n t e r s t ( the U.S. has to main ta in an i n t e r n a -
t i o n a l order o f dependent r e l a t i o n s to safeguard American corporate p ro -
f i t s ) . ( 5 ) 
None of these fac to rs can be cons idered as a l l - e x p l a n a t o r y . The form 
that U.S. involvement took i n ac tua l s i t u a t i o n s can on ly be exp la ined by 
an a n a l y s i s o f s p e c i f i c c o n d i t i o n s . T h i s j u s t i f i e s and n e c e s s i t a t e s an 
e m p i r i c a l comparat ive approach. To t e s t whether and why i d e o l o g y , s e c u r i t y 
o r economic i n t e r e s t s were d e c i s i v e i n the format ion o f p o l i c y i n these 
cases i s o f an exp lana to ry c h a r a c t e r , which transcends the case s tud ies 
and the t ime l i m i t a t i o n s - i t says something about the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s and 
determinants o f American f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n general . 
Th is study compares the cases o f Vietnam and Indones ia ; they are we l l 
comparable i n regard to geography and time p e r i o d . The d i ve rg ing p o l i c i e s 
o f the U.S. toward the two cases asks f o r a s a t i s f a c t o r y e x p l a n a t i o n . 
The aim o f the a n a l y s i s i s thus to determine under what i ncen t i ves A-
mer ican p o l i c y developed toward the Indonesian and Vietnamese i s s u e s , and 
to l i n k the development o f American f o re ign p o l i c y towards the s p e c i f i c 
cases to developments i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y , i . e . the deepening o f the c o l d war 
How d i d a n t i - c o l o n i a l i s m as a U .S . commitment and source o f p o l i t i c a l 
conduct develop i n the pe r iod 1945-1949? 
The beginning of C o l o n i a l c o n f l i c t s i n Indonesia and Vietnam 
and U.S. p o l i c i e s of non-lnvolveaent, 1945-1947 
R o o s e v e l t ' s death and the f a c t that Truman became p res iden t had 
important r a m i f i c a t i o n s f o r American fo re ign p o l i c y . Roosevel t had f a i l e d 
to c rea te a s o l i d i n s t i t u t i o n a l base f o r h i s p o l i c i e s . Many lead ing f i -
gures w i t h i n the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and the Sta te Department d i d not share 
h i s s p e c i f i c p reoccupat ion w i th a n t i - c o l o n i a l i s m nor h i s opt imism concer -
n ing the p o s s i b i l i t y o f coopera t ion w i th the Sov ie t Union a f t e r the war 
( 6 ) . The r e s u l t s o f t h i s change were r e i n f o r c e d by the f a c t tha t they o c -
cur red a t a h i s t o r i c a l "watershed" i n American f o r e i g n p o l i c y . The Second 
World War a f f e c t e d power p o l i t i c s to an unforeseeable degree. Changes 
o f such magnitude had not occur red s ince the Napoleonic wars . 
The change ) f P res iden t and the s h i f t i n o b j e c t i v e cond i t i ons had 
t h e i r e f f e c t e the U.S. p o s i t i o n on two major i s s u e s : a n t i - c o l o n i a l i s m 
and U . S . - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s . 
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Roosevel t h i m s e l f had been the s t ronges t p ro tagon is t o f a n t i - c o l o n i a l i s m 
and t r us teesh ip plans f o r French Indochina. Truman d id not a t tach such a 
personal s i g n i f i c a n c e to a n t i - c o l o n i a l i s m . Apart from t h i s , i t shou ld be 
noted that a n t i - c o l o n i a l i s m was l a r g e l y a U .S . response to p re -wor ld war 
p reoccupa t ions . A f t e r the War i t seemed p o s s i b l e to secure economic"open 
door" p o l i c i e s wi thout an abso lu te te rm ina t ion o f c o l o n i a l i s m . As f a r as 
the B r i t i s h Empire was concerned, d e c o l o n i z a t i o n took p lace a t a much 
qu i cke r pace than expec ted . War had weakened the power o f France and the 
Nether lands to such an extent tha t i t d i d not seem to be i n the i n t e r e s t 
o f s t a b i l i t y to impai r t h e i r p o s i t i o n any f u r t h e r by i n s i s t i n g on a n t i -
c o l o n i a l i s t p o l i c i e s . ( 7 ) 
R o o s e v e l t ' s f a i l u r e to prov ide an i n s t i t u t i o n a l base f o r h i s p o l i c i e s , 
p o s s i b l y out o f conf idence that he cou ld s t e e r events h i m s e l f , a l s o had 
se r i ous consequences f o r American r e l a t i o n s w i th the S o v i e t Union. 
His concept o f a postwar wor ld was based on l eade rsh ip o f the U .S . and 
on a coopera t ion between the superpowers. He be l i e ved the U .S .cou ld deal 
w i th the Sov ie t Union as a t r a d i t i o n a l wor ld power. Therefore the U.S. 
shou ld be prepared to accommodate R u s s i a ' s s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s . Y a l t a was 
based on a r e c o g n i t i o n o f these needs and, hence, the d i v i s i o n o f Europe 
i n spheres o f i n f l uence was agreed upon . R o o s e v e l t ' s pragmatism as f a r 
as r e l a t i o n s w i th the Sov ie t Union were concerned went together w i th h i s 
i d e a l i s m concern ing the U.N. and a n t i - c o l o n i a l i s m . ( 8 ) 
The Truman Admin i s t r a t i on developed a concept o f S o v i e t p o l i t i c s tha t 
was much more " ideo log i zed" : one would never be able to cooperate wi th the 
Sov ie t Union on f r i e n d l y terms s i nce i t was the abso lu te ant i -model o f 
American s o c i e t y . Sov ie t t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m t r a n s l a t e d i t s e l f i n t o an 
aggress ive f o re ign p o l i c y , and the d i v i s i o n o f the wor ld i n spheres o f 
i n f l uence was immoral and o b j e c t i o n a b l e . At a time when U.S. f o re ign p o l i -
cy was undergoing a general r e a p p r a i s a l , the Sta te War Navy Coord ina t ing 
Committee asked theSta te Department f o r a c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f the American 
p o s i t i o n on Indochina. 
In A p r i l , May, and June of 194S, a d i s c u s s i o n w i th the Sta te Department 
took p lace which would be d e c i s i v e f o r the next few year ; . . The tone was 
se t by the f o l l o w i n g arguments, expressed In an e a r l y s ' ge i n a repor t 
by the O f f i c e o f S t r a t e g i c S e r v i c e s : ( l ) the Sov ie t Union had become the 
s t ronges t na t ion i n Europe and A s i a and might be e x p a n s i o n i s t ; ( 2 ) the 
Uni ted S ta tes should check the spread o f Russian con t ro l and i n f l u e n c e ; 
(3) f i r s t p r i o r i t y o f the U.S. should be the c r e a t i o n o f a European 
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American b l o c ; (4)more s p e c i f i c a l l y , France should be res to red as a "g rea t 
power". The r por t l i nked the recovery o f European nat ions to the main te-
nance o f Eure ean empires i n A s i a , say ing that the U.S. encouraged the 
European pot,«rs to l i b e r a t e t h e i r ru le thereby he lp i ng to check " S o v i e t 
i n f l uence i n the s t i m u l a t i o n o f c o l o n i a l r e v o l t " . ( 9 ) Th is i s an o l d theme. 
The i n t e r e s t of the U .S . i s to promote evo lu t i ona ry development toward 
s t a b l e democrat ic s o c i e t i e s i n the Th i r d Wor ld , coopera t ing i n an i n t e r - • 
na t i ona l concer t w i th the West. The repor t went f u r t h e r , arguing tha t i t 
was not i n the i n t e r e s t uf the U.S. to 
champion Bohèmes of international trusteeship which may 
provoke unrest and result in colonial désintégration, and may 
at the same time alienate us from the European states whose help 
we need to balance the Soviet power. (10) 
The need to formulate a new p o l i c y toward the Far East t r i g g e r e d a 
vehement d i s c u s s i o n w i t h i n the S ta te Département, p a r t i c u l a r l y between the 
O f f i c e of European A f f a i r s and the Far Eas te rn O f f i c e s . The s o - c a l l e d 
European is ts argued that the "nega t i ve " p o l i c y the Roosevel t adm i n i s t r a t i on 
had fo l l owed on Indochina had aroused French s u s p i c i o n s and seve re l y damaged 
American r e l a t i o n s w i th France . A s i a n l s t s , most ly from the D i v i s i o n o f S . E . 
As ian A f f a i r s , warned aga ins t French r e s t o r a t i o n i n Indoch ina , s i n c e the 
re fusa l of France to make s i g n i f i c a n t concess ions to Indochinese na t i ona l i sm 
cou ld provoke a b lood bath which would impe r i l the s t a b i l i t y of S . E . A s i a or 
even s t imu la te a Pan A s i a t i c movement d i r e c t e d aga ins t Western powers. 
The A s i a n i s t s d i d not have a d i f f e r e n t assessment o f the f i n a l aims of 
American f o r e i g n p o l i c y , namely a s tab le S . E . A s i a and an evo lu t i ona ry 
development, but they d i f f e r e d i n op in ion on the way to secure these a ims: 
the U.S. should not re t rea t too much from i t s a n t i - c o l o n i a l i s t commitment 
and should use i t s i n f l uence on the French and the Dutch to a maximum to 
make them f o l l o w a more l i b e r a l p o l i c y . To these A s i a n i s t s , preoccupied 
w i th the n a t i o n a l i s t s ' demands i n the Far Eas t and i d e n t i f y i n g themselves 
more w i th the Rooseve l t t r a d i t i o n o f s e l f de te rm ina t i on , i t d id not seem 
r i g h t to s a c r i f i c e Indochinese demands to acqu i re French support elsewhere 
i n the wo r l d . O r i g i n a l l y a compromise was worked out which requ i red from 
the French a f u l l statement o f t h e i r i n t en t i ons f o r Indochina and would 
s p e c i f i c a l l y i n q u i r e as to t h e i r p lans f o r s e l f r u l e and the treatment o f 
f o r e i g n commerce. 
However, some developments made the p o l i c y s h i f t more toward the 
European is t po in t of v iew, i . e . an uncond i t i ona l support o f the French and 
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t h e i r r e s t o r a t i o n i n Indochina and on ly vanue déc la ra t ions o f the 
d e s i r a b U i t y o f a r e fo rm is t p o l i c y to be fo l lowed i n Indochina. At the U.N. 
conférence i n San F r a n c i s c o , French support was needed, and the French 
M i n i s t e r o f Fore ign A f f a i r s , B i d a u l t , ¡nade clear to h i s American 
c o l l e a g u e , S t e t t e n i u s , tha t he d ismissed American condemnations of French 
colonial isra and that al though France had "no i n t e n t i o n to p lace Indochina 
under the t r u s t e e s h i p System" they had committed themselves to g ive the 
Indochinese people g rea te r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e i r government. (11) 
By A p r i l 4 t h , 1945, ac t i ons taken by the French Res is tance i n Indochina 
aga ins t the Japanese were supported by American a i r f o rces i n C h i n a , 
cont rary to the o r i g i n a l American p o l i c y . James Dunn, a sen io r o f f i c i a i o f 
the European d i v i s i o n dec la red to B i d a u l t that "no o f f i c U p o l i c y Statement 
of th1s government has ever quest ioned even by i m p l i c a t i i\ French 
sovere ign ty over Indochina" This was regarded as an o f f i c i a i statement o f 
p o l i c y . i n exchange fo r the r écogn i t i on o f French c l a i m s , the U .S . d i d not 
ask f o r any e x p l i c i t reforms concerning Indoch ina; French coopérat ion was 
cons idered to be more important than c o l o n i a l re form. (12) 
A t h i r d Step i n American p o l i c y changes w i t h regard to the i ssue was 
the i n c l u s i o n of French fo rces 1n SEÄC; al though of l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l 
i m p l i c a t i o n because o f the l i m i t e d s i z e o f French f o r c e s , i t was to the 
French o f extreme importance to s t rengthen t h e i r c l a i m on Indochina. Unen 
De Gau l l e asked Truman i n May 1945 f o r French m i l i t a r y p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the 
l i b é r a t i o n o f Indoch ina , Truman expressed h i s app réc ia t i on of F rance ' s o f f e r 
of ass i s t ance and h i s general approval to French m i l i t a r ' a s s o c i a t i o n w i th 
the U.S. i n tha t t h e a t e r , making an Implementation on ly dépendent on the 
approval of the m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s . (13) 
Before the end o f the war aga ins t Japan , a p o l i c y paper was fo rmu la ted . 
June 22, 1945, on the cond i t i ons i n Japanese occupied t e r r i t o r i e s and the 
ob jec t i ves and p o l i c i e s o f the U .S . The opening words are somehow symbol ic 
f o r the American p o s i t i o n and eventual i n t e r v e n t i o n and involventent In the 
f o l l o w i n g y e a r s : 
Uhen V day comea in the Far East and the Pacifia, i t will be the 
reeult in largeat meoaure of the military might and eacrificea 
of the U.S. In return the American people ask for a reasonable 
assurance of peace and security in thie great area and economic 
welfare. (14) 
E x p l i c i t l y the paper desc r ibes the b a s i c dilemma of U .S . p o l i c y i n the 
d e c o l o n i z a t i o n o f Indonesia and Indoch ina , which i s tha t o f hartnonlzing 
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i t s p o l i c i e s w i th regard to two o b j e c t i v e s : increased p o l i t i c a l freedom 
fo r the Far E a s t , and the maintenance of the un i t y o f the lead ing Uni ted 
Nat ions i n meeting t h i s problem. The U.S. should uphold the p r i n c i p l e s 
s t a t e d i n the A t l a n t i c C h a r t e r , but a t the same time " a v o i d any course o f 
a c t i o n which cou ld s e r i o u s l y impa i r the un i t y of the major Uni ted N a t i o n s " . 
(15) 
Regarding Indoch ina , the p o l i c y paper a n t i c i p a t e d se r i ous d i f f i c u l t i e s 
f o r the French to r e s t o r e o rde r ; the independence sent iment was b e l i e v e d 
to be i n c r e a s i n g l y s t rong i n the a rea . The paper noted tha t the French 
showed l i t t l e i n t e n t i o n o f g i v i n g the Indochinese self.government and that 
never the less an inc reased measure o f sel f -government would seem e s s e n t i a l 
i f the Indochinese are to be r e c o n c i l e d to cont inued French c o n t r o l . ( 1 6 ) 
In con t ras t to the d i f f i c u l t i e s expected between the French and the 
Indoch inese, the p o l i c y paper d id not expect se r i ous d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h the 
r e s t o r a t i o n o f the Dutch ru l e i n Indones ia : 
At the conclusion of the war there will probably be a generally 
quiescent period in the relations between the Dutch and the 
native population of the Netherlandse East Indies...The great 
ma88 of the natives will welcome the expulsion of the Japanese 
and the return of the Dutch to control. Only in some areas, as 
in sections of Sumatra, will the Dutch face a difficult problem 
because of anti-Dutch sentiment and the shortage of Dutch man-
power. (17) 
The Indonesian independence movement was s e r i o u s l y underest imated. The 
S ta te Department paper expected a p o l i t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n on reforms to take 
p lace among The Hague, The Dutch i n the East I n d i e s , and the Indones ians. 
Such a d i s c u s s i o n , however, was expected not to a r i s e u n t i l the Imper ia l 
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Conference, which was promised by the Dutch Government. 
From t h i s , i t was a n t i c i p a t e d that Indonesia would émerge w i th e s s e n t i a l l y 
a dominion s ta tus i n the Dutch Commonwealth. 
A few éléments are of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t i n t h i s p o l i c y paper: 
(.1) the emphasis on Western coopérat ion—not on ly would an o b s t r u c t i o n of 
European p o l i c i e s i n the East prevent an e f f e c t i v e coopérat ion w i th thèse 
coun t r i es i n Europe , but t h e i r présence i n the Far Eas t i s now re -eva lua ted 
as a source o f r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i t y ; (2) independence o r the r i g h t of s e l f -
de terminat ion i s not mentioned anymore—one speaks about " the oppor tun i ty 
f o r dépendent communities to achieve an i n c r e a s i n g measure of s e l f -
government", an o b j e c t i v e vague enough ot r ece i ve approval by the French 
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and the Dutch; and (3) the U.S. p o l i c y recommended i s one o f non - i n t e r v en -
t i o n i n the a f f a i r s of both Indonesia and Indoch ina. (18) 
In the context o f t h i s s h i f t i n p o l i c y , one should look at the m i l i t a r y 
d e c i s i o n s taken a t Potsdam. The área of Indonesia and Vietnam were 
o r i g i n a l l y under American command, and would be l i b e r a t e d by American 
t roops . At Potsdam the dec i s i ón was taken that B r i t i s h fo rces under Lord 
Mountbatten would be respons ib le f o r the l i b e r a t i o n and occupat ion o f 
Indones ia . Indochina was to be occupied by B r i t i s h t r o o r 'below the 16th . 
pa ra l l e í , wh i l e Chinese troops would occupie the northe n par t o f the 
count ry . (19) Moreover, U .S. m i l i t a r y endorsed fo rma l l y French m i l i t a r y 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the war aga ins t Japan and agreed tha t French troops would 
best be employed i n Indoch ina. An American l i b e r a t i o n i n Indochina would 
have created se r i ous problems f o r the U . S . , which had the dilemma of 
ma in ta in ing p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s w i th both the French and the Indochinese 
each having d i v e r g i n g g o a l s . (20) Thus, i n the sp r i ng o f 1945 the b a s i s 
was l a i d f o r American p o l i c y to be fo l lowed w i th respect to the Indonesian 
and Indochinese issues i n the immediate postwar p e r i o d . F i n a l l y , the Truman 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n agreed upon the recogn i t i on of French sovere ign ty over 
Indoch ina , a l i b e r a t i o n and occupat ion by B r i t i s h and Chinese t r oops , 
i ns tead o f by Amer icans, and an U.S. p o l i c y o f n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n . 
U .S . f o re ign p o l i c y i n 1945 was marked by changes i n o b j e c t i v e cond i t i ons 
as we l l as by personnel changes, which e x p l a i n a gradual s h i f t from a n t i -
c o l o n i a l isi» as a p o l i t i c a l preoccupat ion toward a s t rong preoccupat ion w i th 
the economic and p o l i t i c a l recovery o f Europe. The c r e a t i o n of a s t rong 
Western Europe, nade up o f v i a b l e democrat ic s t a t e s which would form a ' 
b u f f e r aga ins t the Sov ie t Un ion , became one of the tnost important o b j e c t i v e s 
o f American f o r e i g n p o l i c y , 1f not the most important one. Support o f Europe 
was considered to be i n d i v i s i b l e i n the sense that one cou ld not b u i l d up a 
s t rong Western Europe and at the same time cha l lenge i t s a s p i r a t i o n s e l s e -
where i n the w o r l d . ¡ t i s remarkable that t h i s concept as a premise of 
f o re ign p o l i c y was hard ly ever s e r i o u s l y d i s p u t e d . (21) Th is led the U .S . 
to abide w i t h French and Dutch c o l o n i a l a s p i r a t i o n s i n S . t . A s i a . These 
were "merely 1 ' o f a r e s t o r a t i v e na tu re , aimed a t con t i nu ing to p e r f o r a the 
r o l e of the c o l o n i a l power they had p layed before the war i n the á rea , at 
r e s t o r i n g t h e i r i n f l u e n c e , and a t re imposing t h e i r r u l e . Apart from the 
economic, p o l i t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s France and Ho l land had i n 
r e s t o r i n g t h e i r empi res , these i ssues had a s t rong psycho log i ca l and moral 
aspec t . Having been defeated i n World War I I , France and Ho l land f e l t a 
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s t rong need to recover t h e i r s e l f conf idence and p r e s t i g e . For F rance , 
c o n s c i o u s o f a g l o r i ous past and s e n t s i t i v e about i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s t i g e , 
t h i s argument was unquest ionably more important than f o r the Nether lands. (22) 
M o r a l l y , c o l o n i a l i s m had always been defended w i th the argument tha t a task 
had to be completed, and a f t e r the war t h i s was i n te rp re ted as lead ing to a 
moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y toward As ian sub jec ts to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the shaping o f 
t h i e r s o c i e t i e s . l t would be immoral not to bear these r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and 
to "abandon" the c o l o n i a l possess i on . 
F rance ' s p o s i t i o n s was c r u c i a l i n a Europe whiçh had to be res to red 
a f t e r World War I I . Th is was an e s s e n t i a l leverage France had versus the 
U.S. I t was De G a u l l e ' s achievement to e x p l o i t t h i s leverage to a maximum. 
At a time when France was r e l a t i v e l y weak and dépendent on the U .S . f o r i t s 
m i l i t a r y and economie s u p p l i e s , i t d i d not have as a cohsequence a propor-
t i o n a l dependence i n ternis o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y . ( 2 3 ) Independence f o r France 
was not on ly an aim i n i t s e l f , but i t was a means to maximize i t s bear ing 
on i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s and to use i t s leverage f u l l y . The F rench-Sov le t 
t r ea ty concluded i n December 1944 was i n t h i s sensé an ex t rao rd ina ry pièce 
o f " r e a l p o l i t i k " , as were French p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y t a c t i c s a t Val 
d 'Aos ta and S t u t t g a r t i n the s p r i n g o f 1945. (24) 
The G a u l l i s t expérience d i d not remain an i s o l a t e one, s i nce i t succeeded 
i n r a l l y i n g p o l i t i c a l op i n i on around a b a s i c consensus on French f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y . As Grosser desc r ibes I s : 
.• .V'essential de l'héritage gaulliste, s'est la volonté de 
refaire de la France une des grandes puissances mondiales et de 
lui assurer une independence sourcilleuse a l'égard des autres 
grands. (25) 
F r a n c e ' s a s p i r a t i o n s to pursue an independent f o r e i g n p o l i c y f requen t l y 
cha l lenged American p o l i c i e s , but there were some s t rong mot iva t ions on the 
s i de o f the U .S . not to obs t ruc t them. (26) The domestic p o l i t i c a l c o n s t e l -
l a t i o n i n France inc reased F rance ' s leverage w i th the U .S . The French 
Communists came out o f the war as the b igges t p a r t y ; a t the é l e c t i o n s o f 
1945 They rece ived more than 25%,of the vo tes . Moreover, the par ty had one 
m i l l i o n members and the s i g n i f i c a n t support o f the labour u n i o n , the CGT 
and i t s f i v e and a h a l f m i l l i o n members. I t was t r a d i t i o n a l l y the best 
organ ized par ty and had an enormous p res t i ge at the end o f the war because 
of i t s r o l e i n the r é s i s t a n c e . Some w r i t e r s , such as E l g e y , desc r ibe the 
s i t u a t i o n i n 1945 as a revo lu tonary one. Accord ing to them only three 
éléments kept the Communists from launching a r é v o l u t i o n : the présence o f 
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American t r oops , the f a c t that part of the PCF 's sympathizers would not 
Support a r é v o l u t i o n , and the f a c t that Moscow d id not want a r é v o l u t i o n 
to take p lace i n F rance , but ra ther p re fe r red a populär f r on t a l t e r n a t i v e . 
(27) Accord ing to E l g e y , France counted only two rea l fo rces at the b e g i n -
n ing o f 1946: the Communist Par ty and General de G a u l l e . De Gau l le would 
some years l a t e r déc lare i n a ra ther dramat ic way: " J ' a v a i s les.mains nues , 
e t cependant, j ' a i empêché l a d i c t a t u r e communiste de s ' é t a b l i r dans l e 
pays" (28) 
Taking i n t o account that the S o c i a l i s t Par ty i n F rance , the SFIO, and the 
C a t h o l i c HRP each had a few l e s s seats i n the Assembly than the commùnists, 
the s t rength o f the Comm n i s t s i n 1945-46 should not be exaggerated. With 
the format ion of a t r i p a r t i t e government, the Commùnists, as the b igges t 
p a r t y , asked f o r the H i n i s t r y of Fore ign A f f a i r s , In te rna l A f f a i r s , o r 
Defence. De Gau l l e re fused to a l low the PCF to occupy any o f these 
m i n i s t r i e s , a r g u i n g t h a t t h i s would not conform te Fränce's nonal igned 
fo re ign p o l i c y . De Gau l le got h i s way, remarkably enough, and the Commùnists 
entered the government r e c e i v i n g only par t o f the Defence M i n i s t r y . ( 2 9 ) 
The f a c t remains tha t the PCF was a major fo rce i n France i n 1945-46. 
I t s s t reng th immediately inc reased the leverage the p a r t i e s had v i s - a - v i s 
the U.S. In Washington i t a l s o increased the awareness o f the p o s s i b l e 
conséquences which American p o l i c y might have on Fränce's i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l 
c o n s t e l l a t i o n . A p o l i c y which would obs t ruc t Fränce's imper ia l a s p i r a t i o n s 
would r i s k caus ing a swing i n f rench p u b l i c op in ion away from those p a r t i e s 
that had a l i gned themselves w i t h Washington. The S ta te Der-rtement feared 
tha t any a c t i v e involvement by the U.S. would r e s u l t i n jsentment by the 
French p u b l i c , which would favour the Communist P a r t y . T i s f ea r was 
expressed by some I n f l u e n t i a l S ta te Departement o f f i c i a i s , d i s c u s s i n g a U .S . 
o f f e r o f "good o f f i c e s " . They wor r ied that such an o f f e r might have added 
to the d i f f i c u l t i e s o f the présent French government and would be se i zed 
upon by the French Commùnists as a means o f enbar rass lng the government. In 
a d d i t i o n : "We noted that the French press i s now harp ing upon the danger o f 
• f o re i gn i n t e r v e n t i o n ' i n Indoch ina" . (30) In gênerai the PCF kept a low 
p r o f i l e on the i s s u e o f Indochina i n o rder not to a l i e n a t e domestic op in ion 
and to remain an acceptab le c o a l i t i o n .par tner . 
Apart from the gênerai concern about keeping good r e l a t i o n s w i t h i t s 
European a l l i e s , t h i s f a c t o r meant a f u r t he r r e s t r a i n t . U .S . p o l i t i c a l 
behav iour . A n e u t r a i i s t p o l i c y toward Indonesian and In ochinese c o l o n i a l 
c o n c i l c t s seemed best to serve c o n t r a d i c t o r y American L . t e r e s t s . I d e a l l y , 
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a l i b e r a l re fo rm is t p o l i c y by the Frenen and the Dutch and a moderate 
s tand by the n a t i o n a l i s t moveinents would lead to succes tu l nego t ia t i ons 
tha t would l e a d , i n t u r n , to a s o l u t i o n , analogous to the P h i l i p p i n e s 
model. The Truman A d m i n i s t r a t i o n perce ived i t s i n t e r e s t s to the best served 
i n the región not by an abso lu te t e rm iná t i on o f c o l o n i a l r u l e , but by the 
cooperat ion between Europeans and As ians w i t h i n a commonwealth framework. 
Such a set t lement would ensure the maintanance of Western i n f l u e n c e , which 
was perce ived to be a f a c t o r o f s t a b i l i t y . Moreover, keeping an economie 
stake i n S . E . A s i a would bu t t ress Europe 's economie recovery . 
Some major "Hf ferences e x i s t e d between the Vietnamese and Indonesian 
cases . The conr.unist tendencies o f the Vietminh d i s t i n g u i s h t h i s movement 
from the Indor ¡s ian n a t i o n a l i s t movement. Continuous t h i r d par ty involvement 
s t r o n g l y l i nked to a r e l a t i v e m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l weakness o f H o l l a n d , 
as opposed to F rance , marked the Indonesian case . Th is was at the root o f a 
development towards i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n that would prove to be e s s e n t i a l 
f o r the succes o f the Indonesian d e c o l o n i z a t i o n . Involvement o f B r i t a i n 
would lead even tua l l y to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f the Indonesian i ssue 
i n a U.N. con tex t . In the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena the Repub l ic o f Indonesia had 
acqu i red s t rong support among Arab c o u n t r i e s , Ind ia and A u s t r a l i a . Th is was 
an aspect o f some importance i n the t rend towards i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . In 
g l a r i n g c o n t r a s t , the Oemocrate Repub l ic of Vienam f a i l e d to a t t a i n 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l s ta tus and the Indochinese i s s u e remained an e x c l u s i v e French 
concern. 
These developments may be e s s e n t i a l to understanding d i v e r g i n g 
developments; Th is should not prevent us from observ ing that the Vietnamese 
and Indonesian revo lu t i ons were s t r u c t u r a l l y s i m i l a r . P r i m a r i l y n a t i o n a l i s t , 
they had s t rong s o c i a l over tones . In terms of the roots of the r e v o l u t i o n 
and the dynamics o f the s t r u g g l e s , as w e l l as the r o l e o f the French and 
the Outch, both i ssues are comparable. (31) In the context o f the dynamics 
o f d e c o l o n i z a t i o n - - t h a t i s to s a y , f ocus ing on the r e l a t i o n between c o l o n i a l 
power and c o l o n i z e d peop le . - t he communist charac te r o f the Vietminh was not 
a s t r u c t u r a l element that d i s t i n g u i s h e d the Vienamese from the Indonesian 
case . The r a d i c a l demands o f the Vietminh were reason why France cou ld not 
come to an agreement w i th the V ie tm inh , not the communist i n c l i n a t i o n o f the 
movement.''The communist cha rac te r of the Vietminh was, however, an element 
which inc reased the leverage of France v i s - a - v i s the U.S. 
U .S . d i p l oma t i c correspondence shows that American pol icymakers were 
a l ready concerned i n 1945-46 about the ques t ion o f the extent to which 
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Vietnamese n a t i o n a l i s t s were l e f t i s t s , communi s t s or MosCOM mar ione t tes . 
Acheson reminded Abbot Kow Mo f fa t , d i r e c t o r of the S . E . As ian O f f i c e , who 
went on a m iss ion to Vietnam i n December 1946, o f 
Ho'a olear record ae an agent of international commv ism, the 
confuaed political eituation in France and the suppt Ho Wae 
receiving from the French Communist Party. (32) 
This concern on the pa r t o f the S ta te Department l e d Gab r i e l Kolko to argue 
that U.S. pol icymakers were a l ready i n 1945-46 r e p e l l e d by the communist 
cha rac te r o f the Vietminh and that t h i s , i n f a c t , assured American support 
fo r the French r e s t o r a t i o n i n Indochina. Whatever the mer i t s o f K o l k o ' s 
main t hes i s (accord ing to K o l k o , the c a p i t a l i s t System d i c t a t e d an 
o p p o s i t i o n to the l e f t on a g loba l s c a l e ) , the ma te r i a l d i scussed above 
concerning American involvement i n the indonésien and Vietnamese cases does 
not prov ide s u f f i c i ë n t évidence f o r h i s argument that i t was the American 
percep t ion of the communist nature o f the Vietminh whicH Jetern ined U .S . 
p o l i c i e s towards Vienam i n t h i s p e r i o d . (33) In s p i t e c the f a c t that the 
Repub l ic movement i n Indonesia was not communist-domin; e d , American p o l i c y 
d id not a c t i v e l y oppose Dutch c o l o n i a l p o l i c i e s o f r e s t o r a t i o n . The reason 
f o r t h i s was tha t coopérat ion w i th the Nether lands and European recovery 
i n general was cons idered to be a f i r s t o b j e c t i v e o f American f o r e i g n p o l i c y 
i n the pe r iod 1945-46. Because o f the importance o f F rance , t h i s f a c t o r must 
have counted even more heavi ly i n d e f i n i n g American f o r e i g n p o l i c y towards 
Vietnam. The p r i o r i t y g iven to European coopérat ion determined American 
fo re ign p o l i c y towards both d isputes i n these y e a r s , at l e a s t as much as 
d i d the percep t ion o f the n a t i o n a l i s t movements i n Indonesia and Vietnam. 
(34) 
Looking a t the development o f both i ssues and the r o l e of the r espec t i ve 
ac to rs i n the c o n f l i c t s , the pe r iod 1945-46 i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from the 
subséquent per iod '1947-48 w i th respect to the in tens i t y o f the c o n f l i c t . The 
French and the Dutch had not ye t engaged i n a f ü l l Sca le war w i th the 
Vietnamese and the Indones ians , and nego t ia t i ons were going on i n 1945-46. 
In December 1946, war broke out between France and the V ie tm inh , and i n J u l y 
1947, war broke out between the Dutch and the Indonesian Repub l i cans . These 
events opened new fase i n the c o n f l i c t s , marked by growing resentment and 
r a d i c a l i z i n g tendenc ies , which impaired the p o s s i b i l i t é s of reach ing a t rue 
s o l u t i o n . Dur ing the years 1945 and 1946 the Vietminh seems to have been not 
ye t as r a d i c a l i z e d i n p o l i t i c a l terms as i t would become i n l a t e r y e a r s . 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l l y , tens ions were i n c r e a s i n g over t h i s p e r i o d , but the 
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Situation would d e t e r i o r a t e s e r i o u s l y i n 1947. The U . S . ' a t t i t u d e towards 
the Vietminh in 1945-46 was an ambiguous and an e s p e c i a l l y exp lo ra to ry one. 
In short, the p o s i t i o n s were not ye t f i x e d . ( 3 5 ) This per iod was marked by 
a c e r t a i n " f l u i d i t y " , which o f f e red p o t e n t i a l l y many oppo r tun i t i es to reach 
a compromise. Because of i t s power, the U.S. cou ld have p layed an important 
r o l e i n reaching such compromises. I t was prevented from doing s o , due to 
the f a c t that i t was preoccüpied w i th European recovery and underest imated 
the importance of the developments in S . E . A s i a . This led to a p o l i c y o f 
non-involvement i n respect to the c o n f l i c t s . The U.S. could have t r i e d to 
e s t a b l i s h a harmonious r e l a t i o n s h i p w i th the p r i n c i p a l fo rces of Indonesian 
and Vienamese nationalism. I t d i d n o t , and consequent ly the movements became 
more p o l a r i z e d . Th is leads to the conc lus ion tha t i n the per iod 1945-46 
p r o p i t i o u s oppo r tun i t i es were missed by American f o re ign p o l i c y . 
Voices o f d i s s e n t , i n c l u d i n g that o f John Ca r te r V i n c e n t , who was 
O i r e c t o r of the O f f i c e of Far Eastern A f f a i r s , were heard but d id not lead 
to a more a c t i v e U.S. r o l e i n Indochina. WhetherU.S. involvement would have 
been ab le to g i ve a déc i s i ve turn to events i s d i f f i c u l t to détermine. Yet 
i t i s a D ü r i n g to th ink of the p o s s i b l e conséquences o f Implementation o f 
V i n c e n t ' s September 1945 recommendation to Acheson. Th is suggested an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n v e s t i g a t o r y commission and nego t ia t i ons i n v o l v i n g the U . S . , 
B r i t a i n , C h i n a , France and the Vietnamese concerning the Indochinese i s s u e . 
I t would have been meant an attempt to i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e nego t ia t i ons and 
cou ld p o s s i b l y have prevented the i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f war , which would 
take p lace on ly three years l a t e r . 
Towards involvement i n a p e r i o d of p o l a r i z a t i o n , 1947-1949 
The i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n and the i n t e r n a l Indonesian and Vietnamese 
s i t u a t i o n s underwent d r a s t i c changes i n the per iod 1945-49. I n t e r n a l l y there 
was a tendency towards p o l a r i z a t i o n and r a d i c a l i z a t i o n , which s e r i o u s l y 
impeded the chances f o r a peacefu l s o l u t i o n between the European powers and 
the r e v o l u t i r l a r y movements i n the c o l o n i e s . I n t e r n a t i o n a l l y , r e l a t i o n s 
between the ' . S . and the S o v i e t Union de te r i o ra ted r a p i d l y . Wi th in the U .S . 
the f o re ign p o l i c y debate centered on the p o l i c y v i s - a - v i s the S o v i e t Un ion , 
wh i l e Europe remained the main t héâ t re of superpower c o n t e s t . Looking at 
As ian developments from an American pe rspec t i ve one should remember that the 
years 1947-48 were h e a v i l y dominated by the beginn ing o f the Marsha l l P lan 
and NATO, the c r i s e s i n Greece , Turkey i n 1946, Czechos lovak ia and B e r l i n 
i n 1948. 
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Because of the "primaey of t u r o p e " , pol icymakers were i ne I i ned to 
underest imate developments i n S . E . A s i a and subord inated S . E . As lan p o l i c i e s 
to American ob jec t i ves i n Europe. P o l i c i e s concerning Indonesia and 
Vietnam were i n gênerai dea l t w i th by m i l d - l e v e l o f f i c i a i s i n the S ta te 
Department, who rece ived occas iona l gu ide l i nes from Secre ta ry o f S ta te 
Marsha l l and h i s successor Acheson. (36) M i t h i n American f o re ign p o l i c y , 
emphasis remained l a r g e l y on Europe u n t i l communists took power i n China 
and war broke out i n Korea. As i s w e l l known, thèse events led to an outery 
o f p u b l i c op in ion and to focus ing o f p o l i t i c a l a t t e n t i o n on A s i a . A r e l a t i v e 
s h i f t i n American f o r e i g n p o l i c y from a préoccupat ion w i th European a f f a i r s 
to more g loba l concerns i n the per iod 1947-49 a n t i c i p a t e d the major 
p o l i t i c a l swing i n 1949-50. 
Another f a c t o r was the é v o l u t i o n of American g e o p o l i t i c a l t h i n k i n g , and 
the U . S . ' concept o f s e c u r i t y i n p a r t i c u l a r . These underwent bas i c 
mod i f i ca t i ons j u s t a f t e r the war u n t i l they merged i n t o a r e l a t i v e l y c l e a r l y 
de f ined concept of na t i ona l s e c u r i t y a t the end o f the f o r t i e s . Europe as a 
s e c u r i t y concern o f the U .S . was the main mo t i va t i on behind the Truman 
D o c t r i n e , but the commitments the Doc t r ine made had g loba l i m p l i c a t i o n s . ( 3 7 ) 
Every l o c a l c r i s i s was l i nked to Sov ie t s t ra tegy and was perce ived as a 
P o t e n t i a l cha l lenge i n an Eas t -Ues t con tex t . U .S . na t i ona l s e c u r i t y 
pos tu la ted the i n t e r r e l a t e d n e s s of so many d i f f é r e n t p o l i t i c a l , economic and 
m i l i t a r y f a c t o r s that developments ha l f -way around the globe were seen to 
have an automatic and d i r e c t impact on Amer ica 's core i n t e r e s t s . The 
increased sensé o f i n s e c u r i t y i n the U.S. was the r e s u i t o f a r a p i d l y 
changing wor ld s i t u a t i o n i n which the U .S . underwent a rap id t r a n s i t i o n from 
a r e l a t i v e I s o l a t i o n i s t posture to major i n t e r n a t i o n a l involvement. The 
expérience o f German and Japanese aggress ion seemed to d i c t a t e a p o l i c y o f 
f i rmness and i n s p i r e d the domino theory , wh i ch , app l i ed to A s i a , assumed 
that the acceptance of a communist Vietnam would i n e v i t a b l y lead to a 
f u r t he r expansion o f communism i n S . E . A s i a . Acceptance o f a communist 
regime i n Vietnam was i n p r i n c i p l e ob jec t i onab le because i t was i n t e rp re ted 
as y i e l d i n g to f o re ign agg ress i on , and p o l i t i c a l l y and economical ly i t would 
be a blow to American i n t e r e s t s . 
U .S . p o l i c i e s between 1947-49 demonstrated, however, that the 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n was aware o f the l i m i t e d means i t had a t i t s d i sposa i to 
respond to thèse cha l l enges . A d i r e c t m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n i n China was 
avoided because the U.S. government acknowledged i t s recc ces to be l i m i t e d . 
A p o l i c y P lann ing S t a f f paper , completed i n June 1947, ne :ed tha t 
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t)¡e extent of the calla on this countvy ¿a so gveat in relation 
to our recourues that De aould not contémplate assistance to 
othere on any universal basis, even i f this were désirable. 
A beginning would have to be mode eomeuhere and the beat place 
for a beginning is obvioualy in Europe. (38) 
With in A s i a , Indonesia and Indochina were c l e a r l y cons idered to be of 
secondary importance to the U . S . , a f t e r Japan and Ch ina . 
In b a s i c trends Outch and French c o l o n i a l p o l i t i c s were s i m u l a r . On to 
one hand, both powers negot ia ted w i th and exer ted p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y 
pressure on the r a d i c a l n a t i o n a l i s t movements, which they faced w h i l e , on 
the o ther hand, they attempted to se t up modérate n a t i o n a l i s t movements as 
a l t e r n a t i v e s . Looking at the c o l o n i a l powers' a t t i t u d e s towards the r a d i c a l 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements, we d i s c e r n two approches. One approch, recogn iz ing i n 
the Vietminh and the Republ ic the s t ronges t fo rces o f n a t i o n a l i s m , favored 
n e g o t i a t i o n s . The argument was that a long-terra se t t lement would on ly be 
p o s s i b l e by reach ing an agreement w i th thèse movements. The second approach 
aimed a t the e x c l u s i o n of the r a d i c a l movements and a t nego t i a t i on w i th 
modérate n a t i o n a l i s t s . I t a l s o intended to des t roy the r a d i c á i s , both 
m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l l y . 
The hard l i n e p r e v a i l e d i n Indochina when on December / t h . 1947, France 
s igned a f i r s ' t agreement w i th Bao Dai and i n s t r u c t e d B o l l a e r t , i t s High 
Représen ta t i ve , a few weeks l a t e r 
to carry on, outside the Ho government, ail activities and 
negotiations necessary for the restoration of peaae and freedom 
in the Vietnamese aountriea. (39) 
France would no longer seek a set t lement by nego t i a t i ng w i th Ho Chi Minh. 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n was the primary f a c t o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g devel opulents 
i n the Nether lands East Ind ies from those i n French Indochina. Al though the 
Good O f f i c e s Committee cou ld not prevent the Outch from launch ing a second 
m i l i t a r y a c t i o n aga ins t the r e p u b l i c i n December 1948, i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n 
was among the main reasons why the Nether lands had f i n a l l y to c a p i t ú l a t e 
p o l i t i c a l l y . A déf iance of the op in ions o f the G.O.C. and the U .S . b a c k f i r e d 
on the Outch i n the s p r i n g of 1949 when they found themselves t o t a l l y 
i s o l a t e d and p a r t i a l ] y eut o f f from Marsha l l a i d . R e l i n q u i s h i n g i t s hard l i n e 
and re tu rn ing to a p o l i c y o f nego t i a t i on was e f f e c t i v e l y imposed on the 
Dutch. (40) 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n as a c o n s t r a i n i n g f a c t o r was absent i n the case of 
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Trench Indochina. Med ia t ion could have led to se r ious nego t ia t ions between 
the French and the V ie tm inh , poss ib l y to reforms and to more moderate stand 
on the par t o f the l a t t e r . Th is wou ld have meant " p a c i f i c a t i o n through 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n " as happened i n Indones ia . (Had there been no 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , the Outch probably would have t r i e d to crush the 
Republ ic i n 1947, w i th conséquences analogous to those i n Vietnam; tha t i s , 
a deepening g u é r i l l a war , a puppet reg ime, and a r a d i c a l i z a t i o n of the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement.) I t i s d i f f i c u l t to say what cou ld have been the 
e f f e c t s o f médiat ion and p a c i f i c a t i o n on the ideo lóg ica ' ! and p o l i t i c a l 
p o s i t i o n of the V ie tminh . D i f fé rences e x i s t e d between the p o l i t i c a l and 
i d e o l o g i c a l lean ings of the Vietminh and the Repub l ic o f Indones ia , and 
whether the médiat ion of a t h i r d par ty cou ld have helped moderate the 
p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n o f the Vietnamese n a t i o n a l i s t s remains open to 
s p é c u l a t i o n . 
P o t e n t i a l l y the U.S. was i n a p o s i t i o n i n 1947-49 to p lay a déc is i ve 
r o l i n developments i n S . E . A s i a . The ac to rs i n the Inde s i an and 
Vietnamese c o l o n i a l c o n f l i c t s were aware o f t h i s . (41) • í e U.S. d id not 
prevent France from implementing hard l i n e p o l i c i e s dur ..ig the per iod 
1947-49 and even tua l l y support a French c o l o n i a l s o l u t i o n that was based on 
the e x c l u s i o n o f the main fo rce of n a t i o n a l i s m . I t obs t ruc ted s i m i l a r Dutch 
p o l i c i e s . Th is öeeming a c o n t r a d i c t i o n j u s t i f i e s ask ing the quest ion whether 
American p o l i c i e s v i s - a - v i s Indonesia and Vietnam were c o n s i s t e n t . 
Arguments may be f o r both responses. F i r s t , we cons i er the negat ive 
answer, based on the judgment that the U .S . drew d i f f e i n t conc lus ions out 
o f s i m i l a r observat ions made i n Indonesia and Vietnam. In the Indonesian 
case the American Government c o r r e c t l y po in ted out t ha t : 
...the use of force( by the Dutch )in this situation makes the 
solution far more complex and difficult. The Republic of Indonesia 
represents the largest single political factor...The Republic has 
a two-fold nature. First i t is a political entity; secondly i t is 
at the heart of Indonesian nationalism. This latter attribute can 
not be eliminated by any amount of military force...Real peace in 
Indonesia aan be expected only i f there is a seulement of the 
political issues. (42) 
U.S. p o l i c y makers might w e l l have a r r i v e d a t s i m i l a r conc lus ions i n the 
case o f Vietnam. They( i m p l i c i t l y )admit ted as much i n g ran t ing that the 
Vietminh was the s t ronges t fo rce o f n a t i o n a l i s m and French Bao Dai p o l l c i c i e s 
were a f a c t o r o f uncer ta in outcome. Yet by 1948-49 the Truman A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
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had concluded that the Vietni inh was to be excluded as a nego t i a t i ng par tner 
and r e l u c t a n t l y prepared the ground f o r a more a c t i v e support i n favour of 
the unrepresen ta t i ve and i n e f f e c t i v e Bao Dai regime. (43) 
Mhether incons is tency can be imputed to American f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n South 
Las t As1a dépends upon one 's p e r s p e c t i v e . A t l a n t i c coopérat ion and the 
p o l i t i c a l and economie recovery o f Europe were such h igh f o r e i g n p o l i c y 
p r i o r i t i e s f o r the U .S . tha t i t i s d i f f i c u l t to overest imate these f ac to r s 
i n shaping American f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n S . E . A s i a . 
Kegarding Indones ia , an American p o l i c y paper of September, 1948, s ta ted 
e x p l i c i t l y that the U . S . ' 
immédiate interest in maintaining in pouer a friendly French 
government to asaiet in the furtheranoe of our aima in Europe 
had taken precedence over active etepa looking toward t)ie 
réalisation of our objectives in Indoahina. (44) 
Concerning Indonesia Marsha l l s t r e s s e d i n J u n e , 1948, that i t had been 
and s t i l l was the aim of the U .S . to 
permit the Netherlands to regain and rehabilitate ite economie 
interest? in the Setherlande Eaet Indiee as we l l as to provide 
Btabiliè*,; aa a requiaite to the resumption of normal international 
trade, i-Hiah inoidentally uould facilitate the U.S. program for 
E.H.P.. (4S>) 
Concerning t h i s , i t could be concluded that the "European f a c t o r " was a 
s t rong component determin ing the U . S . ' a t t i t u d e towards both c o l o n i a l i s s u e s . 
A U.S. pe rcep t ion o f the p o l i t i c a l and i d e o l o g i c a l cha rac te r o f the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movements in 1947-48 l e d , i n the case o f French Indoch ina , to 
the "non-acceptance" i n p r i n c i p l e o f the V ie tm inh , and, i n the case o f 
Indones ia , to the "acceptance" i n p r i n c i p l e o f the Repub l ic as a par ty to 
deal w i t h . On the other hand, an éva lua t i on o f French and Dutch c o l o n i a l 
p o l i t i c s had l ed the U .S . to r e j e c t these i n gênerai as a n a c h r o n i s t i c , as 
p l a y i n g i n t o the hands o f communism and consequent ly damaging the U .S . 
i n t e r e s t s . 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f the Indonesian i ssue had forced the U.S. to leave 
i t s p o l i c y of non- involvement towards the c o n f l i c t i n 1947, but i t was 
rep laced by a s t r i c t American n e u t r a l i t y . They gave up t h i s p o l i c y o f 
n e u t r a l i t y on ly i n the summer o f 1948. The immédiate i n c e n t i v e f o r t h i s 
p o l i c y s h i f t was the th rea t presented by a p o l a r i z a t i o n w i t h i n the Indonesian 
Repub l i c and a communist r é v o l u t i o n aga ins t the moderate l e a d e r s h i p . The 
percep t ion of an acute communist th rea t and the b e l i e f that an eventual 
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independent Indonesian s t a t e , dominated by the R e p u b l i c , would be a r e -
l i a b l e fo rce f o r the U.S. i n p o l i t i c a l and economie terms, led the U . S . 
to support the Republ ic more a c t i v e l y and to inc rease i t s pressure on the 
Netherlands i n the f a l l o f 1948 and i n 1949. Moreover, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
agreed that the r e a l i z a t i o n o f i t s secondary o b j e c t i v e , namely, the main-
tenance o f Dutch economie i n f l uence i n Indones ia , was not n e c e s s a r i l y i r -
r e c o n c i l a b l e w i th the es tab l ishment o f an independent Indonesia led by 
the Republ ic (46) . 
U.S. non-involvement p o l i c i e s towards Indoch ina, as fonnulated i n 1945, 
remained b a s i c a l l y unchanged i n the pe r iod 1947-48. Yet ob jec t i ve con-
d i t i o n s had changed qu i te d r a s t i c a l l y : a f t e r December, ,946, French and 
Vietnamese were invo lved i n a f u l l s ca l e war , and a yea r l a t e r the French 
abandoned nego t ia t i ons w i th Ho Chi H inh . Perce ived to be caught between a 
communist Vietminh and anach ron i s t i c French c o l o n i a l p o l i c i e s , the Adminis-
t r a t i o n concluded i n 1947 that i t had s imply "no s o l u t i o n to o f f e r " to the 
i s s u e . (47) The importance o f the developments i n U .S . f o re ign p o l i c y i n 
1947-48 v i s - a - v i s Indochina was not the U.S. formal p o l i t i c a l and economie 
support f o r the French Bao Dai p o l i c i e s — t h i s support would come on ly i n 
1949— but ra the r the gradual development o f percept ions which prepared 
the ground f o r such suppor t . Most important was the assessment that a 
Vietminh dominated s ta te would pose unacceptable r i s k s f o r U .S. na t iona l 
s e c u r i t y , i n s p i t e o f i n d i c a t i o n s that such a s t a t e would not n e c e s s a r i l y 
becone t o t a l i t a r i a n and a l i gned w i th Moscow. . 
A non-acceptante o f Ho Chi Minh i n e v i t a b l y led the U 5. to f o l l ow 
f rench c o l o n i a l p o l i c i e s . In s p i t e o f i t s e f f o r t s not t«. becone i d e n t i f i e d 
w i th Europian c o l o n i a l r u l e , the U.S. accepted the essence o f P a r i s ' c o -
l o n i a l p o l i c i e s , when i t accepted the Bao Dai s o l u t i o n and the exc lus ión 
o f Ho Chi Minh. 1949 was a c r i t i c a l year i n the p o l i t i c a l development o f 
the V ie tminh . The movement r a d i c a l i z e d d r a s t i c a l l y : Communists s t reng then-
ed t h e i r con t ro l over non-comtunists groups, l a i d i n t e r n a t i o n a l l i n k s 
w i th Chinese communists and dec la red openly t h e i r a l l e g i a n c e to i n t e r n a t -
i ona l communism.(48) Recogn i t ion by the S o v i e t Union o f the Vietminh as 
the lawfu l Vietnamese governmen i n January , 1949, was fo l lowed by a recog-
n i t i o n on the s i de o f the U .S . o f the Bao Dai regime.(49) In endors ing 
p o l i c i e s which attempted to i s o l a t e Ho Chi M inh , and to circumvent him 
p o i i t i c a l l y , the U.S. made the same mistake the French had made but w i th 
more se r ious consequences. 
The U .S . cou ld have attempted to e x e r t a moderating i n f l uence on the 
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Vietminh by imposing médiat ion and p o l i c i e s of nego t i a t i on upon th t French 
At l e a s t t h i s might have r e s u l t e d i n the es tab l i shment o f good r e l a t i o n s 
between the U.S. and the V ie tm inh . 
A complex o f many f ac to r s determined U.S. f o re ign p o l i c y v i s - a - v i s the 
d e c o l o n i z a t i o n i ssues o f Vietnam and Indones ia : l o c a l developments i n the 
s p é c i f i e c a s e s , the importance g iven to coopérat ion w i th France and Hol -
l a n d , r e a l i t i e s and percept ions o f the n a t i o n a l i s t movements. 
At the same t ime , U.S. percept ions o f l o c a l developments were h e a v i l y 
i n f l uenced by ex te rna l r e a l i t i e s . F i r s t , p o l i t i c a l developments i n the 
res t o f A s i a s t rengthened t rends w i t h i n the U.S. favour ing more v igorous 
ant i -communist p o l i c i e s i n A s i a . Communist up r i s i ngs i n S . E . A s i a i n 1948 
gave impetus 1: a s h i f t i n American p o l i c y i n the Outch-Indonesian con-
f l i c t . As f a r as American p o l i c i e s towards Vietnam were concerned, 
" the f a l l o f C h i n a " by l a t e 1949 prov ided momentum f o r the movement t o -
wards e a r l y uncond i t iona l r écogn i t i on o f the Bao Oai government. 
The v i c t o r y o f communists i n the Chinese c i v i l war i n t e n s i f i e d American 
concern w i th S . E . A s i a . U .S . c r e d i b i l i t y seemed to be a t s take and p lans 
were drawn up to b o l s t e r Western governments i n Indones ia , T h a i l a n d , Burma, 
the P h i l i p p i n e s , and Indochina.(50) Seen i n t h i s l i g h t , American p o l i c i e s 
were c o n s i s t e n t , even though they led to seemingly c o n t r a d i c t o r y r e s u l t s . 
A second " e x t e r n a l " é lément , a l though of another na tu re , was the s t a t e 
o f U . S . - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s and the r e s u l t i n g fo rmu la t ion o f a new U.S. na t -
iona l s e c u r i t y concept . When the Truman Admin i s t r a t i on turnèd i t s a t t e n -
t i o n towards S . E . A s i a i n 1948-49, i t was i n i t s percept ions (of the r é -
g iona l developments) s e r i o u s l y b iased by the not ions i t had of Sov ie t p o l i -
t i c s and i n t e r n a t i o n a l communism. A co l d war frame of mind prevented p o l i -
t i c i a n s from look ing a t the p a r t i c u l a r contexts o f Vietnamese and Indo-
nes ian developments. They were i n c l i n e d to look a t Vietnam i n 1948-49 as 
i f i t were another Prague or Greece. Indian Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru de-
nounced such an a t t i t u d e when he spoke i n October , 1949, w i th Acheson 
about Indochina. The French experiment i n Indochina w i th Bao Oai was hope-
less and doomed to f a i l u r e , accord ing to Nehru, and the on ly f e a s i b l e so -
l u t i o n was the V ie tminh . True enough, Ho Chi Minh was a communist, but 
" t o b e l i e v e tha t the communists would use a popu la r - f r on t government to 
l i q u i d a t e t h e i r opponents was, he thought , to misapply Eastern European 
expér ience to As ian c o u n t r i e s " . (51) Acheson was not convinced and con-
t inued to draw European a n a l o g i e s : 
As the expériences of both France and Italy showed, the 
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attempt to take over would be inevitable and the 
outaome would depend on the strength of the othei ide. 
Uith the leaderehip of the nationalist movement c '•-
ready in Ho's hands, the outaome in Indoohina W0i~ld 
seem pretty olear.(52) 
ConcluBion 
A f t e r thu war the U.S. found i t s e l f entrenched i n s t r a t e g i e commitments 
a l l over the w o r l d . Some Americans were eager to take up i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
r e s p o n s a b i l i t i e s to safeguard t h e i r i d e o l o g i c a l , p o l i t i c a l , and economie 
i n t e r e s t s . The U.S. attempted to e s t a b l i s h a new wor ld o rde r . P o l i t i c a l l y 
t h l s meant a s tab le and peacefu l wor ld o r d e r ; economica l l y , c a p i t a l i s m and 
a n t i p r o t e c t i o n i s m ; and i d e o l o g i c a l l y , the r e a l i z a t i o n o f U i l s o n i a n i d e a l s , 
i . e . a p l u r a l i s t democratie environment. In the f i r s t p lace i t was c h a l -
lenged i n t h i s by the Sov ie t Union ra ther than by European c o l o n i a l powers. 
(53) 
The paradox ica l r e s u l t of g loba l involvement and the percep t ion o f Sov ie t 
p o l i c i e s was an increased sense o f s e c u r i t y on the s ide o f the U.S.(54) In 
the context o f these general p o l i t i c a l developments one should look a t the 
e v o l u t i o n of American i d e o l o g i c a l commitments, from an a n t i c o l o n i a l i s t i n t o 
a p r i m a r i l y anticommunist one. 
Ana l ys i s of .American fo re ign p o l i c y towards Vietnam and Indonesia shows 
more than anyth ing e l s e how much these i ssues were in te rconnec ted i n Amer i -
can f o re ign p o l i c y w i th p o l i c i e s i n o ther par ts o f the w o r l d . 
The bes t example o f t h i s i n te rconnec t i on i s probably the p r i o r i t y g iven to 
the b u i l d - u p o f a strong Western Europeannucleus capable o f r e s i s t i n g i n t e r -
nal and ex te rna l th rea ts to i t s s t a b i l i t y , as a f a c t o r determining U.S. po-
l i c i e s towards Vietnam and Indonesia . 
"Pr imacy o f Europe" led to a U.S. p o l i c y o f "non- involvement" i n S . E . A s i a . 
"Non- invo lvenent " was not an i n d i c a t i o n tha t the U .S . d i d not pay a t t e n t i o n 
to S . E . As ian developments, but ra the r tha t S . E . A s i a as a reg ion was p e r i -
phera l and ra ted low among American geographic p r i o r i t i e s . ( T h e Netherlands 
were even ra ted h igher than Indonesia as a s t r a t e q i c a r e a ) . American percep-
t i ons and eva lua t i ons evo lved under the i n f l uence o f l o c . , developments on 
the one hand and were a r e f l e c t i o n o f U .S. general p o l i • i c a l th ink ing on the 
o ther hand. 
A p e r c e p t i o n of the Indonesian n a t i o n a l i s t movement led the U.S. to be-
l i e v e that the Republ ican l eadersh ip was a Western o r i en ted e l i t e which was 
not communist and cou ld p o s s i b l y prov ide p o l i t i c a l and economie 
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s t a b i l i t y i n the a r e a . In Vietnam such an e l i t e was not a v a i l a b l e . The 
Vietminh was Western o r i en ted i n the sense that from an As ian pe rspec t i ve 
i t looked to the West, i n c l u d i n g Moscow, and tha t i t s l eade rsh ip had 
s tud ied i n tu rope. I t was not Western o r i en ted i n the sense tha t i t was 
i d e o l o g i c a l l y l i b e r a l - d e m o c r a t i e ; i t was communist dominated. 
The U .S . cons idered i n 1947 the p o s s i b i l i t y of an independent Vietnam 
led by the V ie tm inh . Bas ing i t s p o l i c i e s on the worst p o s s i b l e outcome, 
tha t i t i s that such a Vietnamese s t a t e would become a s a t e l i t e o f Moscow, 
the U.S. decided tha t the Vietminh sbould be excluded from n e g o t i a t i o n s . 
(55) Acceptance of the op in ion o f a Vietminh dominated s ta te was 
i r r e c o n c i l a b l e w i t h the expanded no t ion the Truman Admin i s t r a t i on had 
developed of U .S. na t i ona l s e c u r i t y . The Truman Doct r ine had i d e n t i f i e d 
the phys i ca l s e c u r i t y o f the U .S . w i th the s e c u r i t y o f the whole non-
communist wo r l d . Accord ing to Gadd i s , the Doc t r ine was an example o f 
t r a d i t i o n a l European "balance o f power" p o l i t i c s ra the r than an i n i t i a t i o n 
of a g loba l containment of communism. The r h e t o r i c served l a r g e l y to ensure 
Congress iona l support f o r U .S . a i d to Greece and Turkey. Gaddis mainta ins 
that on ly events around the Korean War i n 1950 would lead to g loba l 
containment p o l i c i e s by the Truman Adm in i s t r a t i on . ( 57 ) 
I t i s t rue the Doc t r ine d i d not lead to a d i r e c t s h i f t i n American 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y v i s - a - v i s Indonesia and Vietnam. A change i n American f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y towards the Dutch Indonesian i ssue took p lace only i n the summer 
o f 1948, and f t was a d i r e c t consequence of an i n t e r n a l communist th rea t 
i n Indones ia . The percep t ion o f t h i s t h rea t was r e i n f o r c e d by communist 
r e v o l t s i n the r e s t of S . E . A s i a i n 1948. 
In Vietnam the th rea t that the Vietminh posed to the U.S. na t i ona l 
s e c u r i t y was not perce ived to be la rge enough to b r i ng about an a c t i v e 
American support f o r the French war e f f o r t aga ins t them i n 1947-48. Th is 
leads Gaddis to argue that " the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s p o l i c i e s suggest tha t i t 
d i d not view the wor ld communist movement as a monol i th between 1947 and 
1950". (58) I would m a i n t a i n , however, tha t the way the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
viewed the Vietminh , namely as promoting the i n t e r e s t o f Moscow and 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l communism, o f f e r s evidence aga ins t Gadd is ' t h e s i s because t h i s 
view tends towards a v i s i o n o f the communist th rea t as mono l i t h i c and o f wor ld 
wide dimensions. 
A complex of three f ac to r s marked U.S. p o l i c y towards the Vietnamese 
issue dur ing the per iod 1947-49. F i r s t , U .S . percept ions o f the Vietminh 
were based on the worst p o s s i b l e s c e n a r i o , namely that d i r e c t l i n k s e x i s t e d 
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between the V ie tn inh and Moscow. Second, the U.S. con t r ibu ted to S o v i e t 
p o l i c l e s ti the a reaagg ress i ve i n t en t i ons and a high degree of conc i s t ency . 
(59) T h i r d , na t i ona l s e c u r i t y was i n t e rp re ted i n a g l o b a l i s t way. These 
fac to rs together d i c t a t e d the e x c l u s i o n o f the Vietminh and led ev en tua l l y 
under esca la ted c i rcumstances to an a c t i v e U .S . involvement aga ins t t h i s 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement. 
American observers would l a t e r ma in ta in that the s t reng th o f the Vietminh 
was i h «large measure due to the F renen f a i l u r e to t r a n s f e r rea l powers to 
an a l t e r n a t i v e government under Bao D a i . The argument imdj was tha t v igorous 
re fo rm is t French p o l i c i e s would have a l lowed Bao Dai t' b u i l d up a s t rong 
anticommunist fo rce of na t i ona l i s t» , drawing away support, from Ho Chi Minh. 
The assumption that i t would be p o s s i b l e to draw support away from Ho was 
an u n r e a l i s t i c one. Non-implementat ion o f l i b e r a l reforms was only a 
secondary reason e x p l a i n i n g the s t rength o f V i e tm inh , s i nce that movement 
had mani fested i t s e l f a l ready i n 1945-1946 as the s t ronges t fo rce o f 
n a t i o n a l i s m . In the case o f Indones ia , a n t i c o l o n i a l i s m and anticommunism, 
as i deo log i ca ) commitments, comfor tably fused i n a U .S . p o l i c y o f p o l i t i c a l 
support f o r the Repub l ic of i ndones ia . I t was more d i f f i c u l t to r e c o n c i l e 
a n t i c o l o n i a l i s m and anticommunism i n U.S. p o l i c i e s versus Vietnam. 
While t h e ' U . S . saw that Sukarno 's Repub l ic was the p i v o t a l ac to r i n 
Indonesian na t i ona l i sm and noted that the Vietminh p layed much the sarne r o l e 
i n Vietnam, i t d i d not draw the same conc lus ions out o f such s i m i l a r 
obse rva t i ons . In Vietnam i t re fused to admit that on ly a p o l i t i c a l 
agreement w i th those who he ld power would a l l ow the r e a l i z a t i o n o f a long 
term se t t l emen t . P o l i c i e s which excluded the Vietminh were at the roots of 
American p o l i c i e s i n the f i f t i e s , namely " to re fuse the country to the 
communists". Refus ing Vietnam to the V ie tm inh , o r denying the Vietminh a 
s u b s t a n t i a l say regard ing the fu tu re of i t s coun t ry , cou ld be c a l l e d the . 
hubr i s of power. The U.S. thought i t cou ld d i c t a t e 1ts form of s o c i e t y even 
1n a remote area of the g lobe. 
The American government j u s t i f i e d i t s p o l i c y of suppor t ing Bao Dai and 
exc lud ing Ho Chi Minh w i th the argument tha t the a l t e r represented on ly a 
communist m ino r i t y and tha t he m is led the ma jo r i t y of Vietnamese by pos ing 
as a n a t i o n a l i s t ra the r than a communist. Ho Chi Minh was seen as the T ro jan 
horse which would b r ing i n Moscow i m p e r i a l i s m . The l o g i c r : the argument 
was that by i t s nature the war e f f o r t aga ins t Ho was ess n t i a l l y n a t i o n a l i s t 
and a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t . 
The argument that the U.S. had to stand up to defend democracy In a t h i r d 
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coun t r y , ev-i,, against a nationalist movement which was recognized as having 
Wide populär support, shows the implicit contradictions o f U i l s o n i a n 
i deo logy . Under p a r t i c u l a r cond i t i ons Wi l son ian idealism l i n k e d w i th an 
expanded no t ion of na t i ona l security could lead to s t rong Imperialist 
tendencies. I t might g ive a strong impetus to and justification f o r U.S. 
involvement i n a third country.(60) Inheren t ly U .S. involvement meant not 
only the defense against to ta l i tar ianism but imposing a model of Society 
as w e l l . Fo r example, when the Departement o f S ta te formulated a policy 
Statement w i th respect to Vietnam i n September 1948, i t stated as i t s first 
objective the élimination o f coirmunist influence i n Indochina and the 
establishment of a s e l f governing nationalist State which " . . . w i l l be 
patterned upon our conception o f a démocratie State as opposed to 
totalitarian".(61) 
One might observe that a western démocratie model o f society, 
représentative and pluralistic, was perhaps not f e a s i b l e i n the Indonesian 
case either. 
G . J . van HOLK. 
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